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1. Introduction
According to Modigliani (1961), the debt burden is a reduction in the aggregate stock
of private capital, which will lead to a reduction in the flow of goods and services for
future generations. Debt is a burden, because it crowds out capital. But does this burden
differ, depending on whether the debt is ”internal” (held by domestic agents) or ”external”
(held by foreign agents)? Conflicting arguments persist in relation to the burden of debt,
according to whether it is internal or external.
Lerner (1948) argues that external public debt is a burden, whereas internal public
debt is not. The sale of bonds abroad generates a charge for the nation, whose servicing
represents a perpetual trade surplus that future generations must bear. According to
Lerner, an ”external debt burden” is the trade surplus needed to finance the debt service.
Mutoh (1985) contests this argument, using the principle of Ricardian equivalence. In this
view, the debt allows a reduction in present taxes, which leads the representative agent
to save (and invest) the equivalent of the tax reduction, from the perspective of future
tax increases. There is no crowding out of capital, and neither does the agent change its
chronic consumption such that debt is neutral, and there is no burden. Mutoh affirms
these relations, whether the debt is held nationally or by foreigners. If a country’s public
debt is held by foreigners, the national savings will support further investments in foreign
securities (foreigners conversely hold more debt and fewer securities). That is, if foreigners
buy national debt, residents buy foreign securities. The capital stock of the two countries
thus remains unchanged, and there is no burden, contrary to the Lerner’s assertion.
However, this proof is obvious only in the context of Ricardian equivalence, according
to which debt is neutral, and there is no burden, either internal or external. In this
context, the internal and external public debt burden are equivalent: it does not exist.
But what about in the Overlapping Generations (OLG) model where there is no Ricardian
equivalence and public debt implies a genuine burden?
The reference for the OLG model is Diamond (1965), who shows that internal debt
crowds out capital, but this effect does not hold for debt held by foreigners. Contrary
to Lerner’s assertions, internal detention imposes burden, while external debt does not.
The purpose of Diamond’s famous article is to show that, surprisingly, internal holding of
public debt is worse than external holding. As Diamond points out in his introduction,
”External debt reduces the utility of an individual . . . surprisingly, internal debt is seen to
cause an even larger decline in this utility level” (Diamond 1965, p. 1126). His famous
equilibrium equation for capital market St = Kt+1 + Bt+1 , also leads him to comment:
”internal debt has a further effect in that it substitutes pieces of paper for physical capital
in the portfolios of wealth owners, thus reducing output.” (Diamond 1965, p. 1141). For
proof, Diamond uses the difference between the two equilibrium conditions for capital
market in case of internal detention St = Kt+1 +Bt+1 versus external detention St = Kt+1.
The first equation involves crowding out of capital, which is not present in second equation.
In Diamond’s view, all national savings is available for the national productive capital
when foreigners who hold the debt. Yet Diamond’s discussion of the superiority of external
debt relies on a partial equilibrium framework. As Thompson1 (1967) and Carlberg (1985)
recognize, Diamond does not work in a general equilibrium framework in open economy.
1”Diamond’s analysis is inconsistent with the existence of an equibrating international market for real
capital” (Thompson 1976, p. 922).
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With Diamond’s OLG model, we show that in an open economy, in a general equilibrium
framework, internal and external public debt burden are equivalent. This equivalence
holds as long as we retain the definition of burden in the sense of Modigliani or Lerner.
Such equivalence arises because the assumption of perfect substitutability between public
debt and productive capital.
2. The model in close economy
We assume two overlapping generations economies. At each date t, in each country, a
generation of size Nt emerges and works during the first period of life, then consumes
savings in the second period. Population growth is realized in each country at the rate n.
In each country, the production function is Cobb-Douglas, with kt = Kt/Nt revealing
the capital per worker, such that:
f(kt) = qt = Akt
α (1)
Also in each country, the government budget identity is Tt +Bt+1 = Gt + (1 + rt)Bt,
where T is tax, G refers to public spending, and B is public debt. Dividing by Nt, we
obtain the constraint by worker τt + (1 + n)bt+1 = gt + (1 + rt)bt. The government of each
country sets the tax rate to maintain a constant long-term debt ratio:
bt
qt
= β ∀t (2)
For simplicity and because we are interested only in the consequences of debt, we
assume that gt = 0, so the value of the tax that balanced the budget in the steady state is
τ = β(r − n)q. We assume that the tax is on capital income which represents a twofold
assumption. The theoretical goal is the ability to highlight only the crowding-out effect of
debt by eliminating its effect on the wage and savings. The practical objective is to allow
for a solution to the recurrence equation, to determine the steady-state capital stock.
For each country, we assume that an agent’s utility function is a logarithmic function
of consumption in both periods of life and that each agent born in t maximizes his utility
under the budget constraints that affect the young and old age:
Max Vt = ln c
y
t +
ln cot+1
1 + ρ
s.t. cyt + st = wt and c
o
t+1 = (1 + rt+1) st − τt (3)
Maximizing the producer’s profit under the production constraint, equation (1), yields
the following factor prices determination:
wt = (1− α)Aktα, rt = αAktα−1 − δ (4)
By solving the consumer’s problem in equation (3), the savings of the young is:
st =
wt
2 + ρ
(5)
In an autarky, in each country, the private wealth of agents At consists of private domestic
assets Kt and national government bonds Bt:
At = Kt +Bt (6)
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The increase in wealth thus is equal to the savings of young Ntst, minus the spending by the
old At, who consume all their wealth (they are egoistic). Therefore, At+1−At = Ntst−At
or At+1 = Ntst; dividing by Nt, we obtain (1 + n) at+1 = st such that for each country:
at+1 =
st
(1 + n)
(7)
Equilibrium conditions in the capital market of each closed economy equalize supply in
equation (7) to demand in equation (6). Written as a variable per worker at+1 = kt+1+bt+1,
and:
st
1 + n
= kt+1 + bt+1 (8)
If we replace saving from equation (5) and wage from equation (4), we obtain:
kt+1 =
(1− α)Akαt
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
− bt+1 (9)
Thus, we obtain the classical result shown by Diamond (1965), namely, crowding out of
capital by public debt.
In this model with a single good, we consider two countries exchanging capital as
representative of the world economy. That is, the world is composed of two countries,
”Tilde” and ”Hat”, such that each variable and parameter used a tilde or a hat to specify
the country to which it refers. We assume that the two economies differ on two points.
First, to exchange capital, the two countries must differ in their accumulation behavior.
As in Buiter (1981), we could anticipate a difference in rate of time preference ρ˜ 6= ρˆ, but
it more interesting for our purposes2 to assume that the two economies differ only in their
public debt ratio β˜ 6= βˆ. We assume that Hat Country has no public debt. Only Tilde
Country has incurred public debt, so we analyze the debt burden for it.
β˜ > 0, βˆ = 0 (10)
Second, the size of these economies differs, N˜ 6= Nˆ . This assumption enables us to
model a case in which the Tilde economy is a small open economy, and the two economies
constitute the world economy (case of general equilibrium framework ignored by Diamond).
Applying equations (10),(2) and (1), for each country we can apply equation (9):
kˆt+1 =
(1− α)Akˆtα
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
and k˜t+1 =
(1− α)Ak˜αt
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
− β˜Ak˜αt (11)
Solving at a steady state:
kˆ∗ =
(
(1− α)A
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
) 1
1−α
and k˜∗ =
(
(1− α)A
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
− β˜A
) 1
1−α
(12)
In autarky, the Tilde Country has crowded out its capital through debt. The decrease
in capital stock when β˜ > 0 is the burden of public debt according Modigliani, for Tilde
Country. We now consider this burden in an open economy.
2Differences in time preference do not change our results, but complicates the interpretation.
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3. Accounting framework of an open economy
In an open economy, agents are able to hold domestic and foreign securities, as well
as domestic and foreign government bonds. By hypothesis, the domestic and foreign
securities, and domestic and foreign government bonds are perfectly substitutable assets.
This assumption is traditional in an OLG model, in which savings transform into capital
and bonds. The net wealth of agents consists of the amounts held, national and foreign
securities, and domestic and foreign government bonds. The private wealth of agents in
Tilde Country and in Hat Country is:
A˜t = γ˜K˜t + ε˜B˜t + (1− γˆ) Kˆt and Aˆt = γˆKˆt + (1− ε˜) B˜t + (1− γ˜) K˜t (13)
where :
γ˜K˜ : capital of Tilde Country held by the tildians,
ε˜B˜t : public debt of Tilde Country held by the tildians,
(1− γˆ)Kˆ : capital of Hat Country held by tildians,
γˆKˆ : capital of Hat Country held by hatese,
(1− ε˜)B˜t : public debt of Tilde Country held by hatese, and
(1− γ˜)K˜ : capital of Tilde Country held by the hatese.
The exogenous parameter ε˜ specifies the identity of the holders of Tilde Country’s
public debt, such that it can be wholly owned by national agents ε˜ = 1 or by foreigners
ε˜ = 0 or by both 0 < ε˜ < 1.
Definition 1 ε˜B˜t is internal public debt, and (1− ε˜)B˜t is external public debt.
Tilde Country lends (1− γˆ)Kˆ and borrows (1− ε˜)B˜t + (1− γ˜)K˜. Its net loan thus is:
E˜t = (1− γˆ) Kˆt − (1− ε˜) B˜t − (1− γ˜) K˜t (14)
Hat Country lends (1− ε˜)B˜t + (1− γ˜)K˜ and borrows (1− γˆ)Kˆ. Its net loan thus is:
Eˆt = (1− ε˜) B˜t + (1− γ˜) K˜t − (1− γˆ) Kˆt (15)
Definition 2 Et is the net international investment position (NIIP). The variation of
E is equal to the current account F , or trade balance (X −M) plus net international
investment income:
Et+1 − Et = Ft = (Xt −Mt) + rtEt (16)
Because there are only two countries, net lending by one is net borrowing by the other, so
by construction:
E˜t = −Eˆt ∀t (17)
Proposition 1 Agents’ wealth is independent of ε˜, that is, of the identity on the debt
holders.
2479
Economics Bulletin, 2013, Vol. 33 No. 4 pp. 2475-2482
A˜t = γ˜K˜t + ε˜B˜ + (1− γˆ) Kˆ = γ˜K˜t + ε˜B˜ + E˜t + (1− ε˜) B˜t + (1− γ˜) K˜t = K˜t + B˜ + E˜t
Aˆt = γˆKˆt+(1− ε˜) B˜+(1− γ˜) K˜ = γˆKˆt+(1− ε˜) B˜+Eˆt−(1− ε˜) B˜t+(1− γˆ) Kˆt = Kˆt+Eˆt
In turn, agents’ wealth can be written independently of ε˜ by identity:
A˜t ≡ K˜t + B˜t + E˜t and Aˆt ≡ Kˆt + Eˆt (18)
The private agents’ wealth does not depend on porfolio composition, as expressed
in equation (13), because by assumption, the domestic and foreign assets and domestic
and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes assets. Therefore, only NIIP is important for
assessing private agents’ wealth.
4. Modigliani burden of internal and external debt
The behaviors of agents in each country are described by equations (4) and (5). In each
country, the wealth increase is equal to the savings of the young minus the dissaving,
or spending of the old, who consume all their wealth (are egoistic). For Tilde Country,
A˜t+1 − A˜t = N˜ts˜t − A˜t or A˜t+1 = N˜ts˜t, and for the two countries:
N˜ts˜t = A˜t+1 and Nˆtsˆt = Aˆt+1 (19)
The equilibrium condition for the capital market in an open economy is based on equations
(19) and (13):
N˜ts˜t+Nˆtsˆt = γ˜K˜t+1+ε˜B˜t+1+(1− γˆ) Kˆt+1+γˆKˆt+1+(1− ε˜) B˜t+1+(1− γ˜) K˜t+1 = K˜t+1+B˜t+1+Kˆt+1
Or written in variables per worker:
N˜ts˜t + Nˆtsˆt = N˜t+1
(
k˜t+1 + b˜t+1
)
+ Nˆt+1
(
kˆt+1
)
(20)
Because the population grows in each country at the same rate n,
N˜ s˜t + Nˆ sˆt = (1 + n)
(
N˜
(
k˜t+1 + b˜t+1
)
+ Nˆ
(
kˆt+1
))
Dividing by N˜ , we can replace saving by (5) and wage by equation (4) to determine
(1− α)Ak˜αt
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
+
Nˆ
N˜
(1− α)Akˆαt
(1 + n)(2 + ρ)
= k˜t+1 + b˜t+1 +
Nˆ
N˜
kˆt+1
In an open economy, whatever t is kˆt = k˜t = kt, therefore,(
1 +
Nˆ
N˜
)
(1− α)Akαt
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
=
(
1 +
Nˆ
N˜
)
kt+1 + b˜t+1
By applying equations (1) and (2) we obtain(
1 +
Nˆ
N˜
)
(1− α)Akαt
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
=
(
1 +
Nˆ
N˜
)
kt+1 + β˜Ak
α
t+1
At a steady state kt+1 = kt = k
∗, we find the steady state capital value for all countries,
that is,
k∗ =
(
(1− α)A
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
− η˜β˜A
) 1
1−α
(21)
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where η˜ = N˜
N˜+Nˆ
is the relative weight of Tilde Country in the world. Comparing equations
(12) and (21) shows that k˜∗ < k∗ for 0 < η˜ < 1 and for 0 < β˜. Crowding out is lower
in the open economy. It even declines to nothing, as in Diamond’s case, if η˜ = 0, that
is in the case of a small open economy. From equation (21), we can derive the following
proposals:
Proposition 2 Public debt crowds out capital, not only Tilde Country’s capital, but also
the capital of all countries. This crowding-out effect increases with the size of Tilde
Country. When Tilde country is smaller, the crowding-out effect is diluted.
Proposition 3 Steady-state capital value and crowding-out effect do not depend on ε˜,that
is, on whether public debt is internal or external. The Modigliani burden is equivalent
whether public debt is internal or external.
In an open economy, the crowding-out effect is independent of the internal or external
holding of public debt. The market equilibrium condition of capital in equation(20) is
independent of ε˜ , (i.e., identity of debt holders), so the value of the steady-state capital
is independent of the identity of the holders of debt as well.
5. Lerner burden of internal and external debt
Following Lerner, now define the external debt burden by the steady-state trade surplus
needed to finance public debt service. Denote Z˜t = X˜t − M˜t as the trade balance of Tilde
Country. Expressing equation (16) in variables per worker (1 +n)e˜t+1− e˜t = f˜t = z˜t + rte˜t,
and at a steady state, we obtain
ne˜ = f˜ = z˜ + re˜ (22)
from which we can extract the burden value of debt, according to Lerner’s meaning:
z˜ = (n− r) e˜ (23)
Definition 3 There is a burden, in Lerner’s definition, if z˜ is positive.
The burden exists, according to Lerner’s definition, if the country supports a trade
surplus at steady state. In dynamic efficiency (r > n), there is a burden if e˜ < 0, such
that the country is a net borrower. This steady-state debt logically is ”paid for” by a
perpetual trade surplus. To calculate the sign of e˜ at steady state, we can write equation
(18) in the steady state:
e˜ = a˜− b˜− k∗ (24)
By replacing wealth by saving value and debt by capital value, we recognize:
e˜ =
(1− α)Ak∗α
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
− β˜Ak∗α − k∗, and,
e˜ < 0 ⇔
(
(1− α)A
(1 + n) (2 + ρ)
− β˜A
)
< k∗1−α
The left-hand side is k˜∗1−α (see Equation 12). We have shown already that if 0 < β˜, then
k˜∗ < k∗ for 0 < η˜ < 1 , so e˜ < 0. We thus conclude that if r > n, z˜ is positive. (Note
that if β˜ = 0, then k˜∗ = k∗ and e˜ = 0 because ρ˜ = ρˆ). We accordingly make the following
proposals:
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Proposition 4 In dynamic efficiency, there is a Lerner burden of public debt.
We also acknowledge that dynamic efficiency is a condition for the existence of a Modigliani
burden as well.
Proposition 5 Both e˜ and z˜ are independent of ε˜, that is, whether, the debt is internal
or external. The Lerner burden is equivalent, whether public debt is internal or external.
The burden of debt as a trade surplus, is independent of its internal or external holding.
As established by Proposition 1 and equation (18), the wealth of agents is independent
of ε˜. If foreigners hold more government debt, they hold less capital, and only the net
international investment position (NIIP) is important for assessing the Lerner burden.
As a result, the trade surplus is independent of ε˜. This independence results from the
assumption of perfect substitutability between securities and bonds, domestic and foreign.
6. Conclusion
In an OLG model in an open economy, public debt generates a burden, according both a
Modigliani meaning and a Lerner meaning. Public debt crowds out capital (which causes
international debt) and requires the export of goods to pay for the debt service. But
these burdens are independent of the internal or external holding of public debt. This
equivalence arises because in an open economy, holding domestic and foreign assets and
bonds is equivalent, under the assumption of perfect substitutability retained in the OLG
model.
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